Prof. Arad identified seven key questions and paradoxes from a national security perspective. First, defining the threat as “existential” brings the necessary focus to the threat, but also could demoralize Israelis, leading to emigration and thus an Iranian victory without the actual use of nuclear weapons. Second, explicit discussion of the military option is necessary to give force to diplomatic pressure, but also means that those leaders who discuss it must be willing to use it. Third, regime change is clearly desirable, but very difficult to engineer. Fourth, deterrence will be the primary Israeli policy if Iran achieves a nuclear weapons capability. However, Israel suffers from a “deterrence deficit,” arising from the policy of ambiguity about its nuclear and military capabilities. Fifth, it is an open question whether Iran can be deterred at all. Some eminent scholars, like Bernard Lewis, believe they cannot. Sixth, seeking security guarantees from the United States may increase Israel’s deterrence, but undermine its independence of action. Prof. Arad said that he believes Israel can have both without any tradeoff, based on the British example. Seventh, should Iran be engaged? He thought that was “a dead end.”

Dr. Lerman suggested that the Iranian challenge be viewed in a larger context than the threat to Israel. Iran, he said, is actively seeking regional hegemony and to fill the role of a balancing power to the West, meaning the US globally and Israel regionally. The American Jewish Committee recently commissioned a study to examine Iranian schoolbooks. Interestingly, they do not posses the type of anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiment seen in Arab countries, but contend that Iran is rising to fill the void created by the fall of the Soviet Union as the dominant force challenging the US in the region and beyond. Iran already has a wide-ranging network beyond its borders, in Latin America, North America, West Africa, and among the Palestinians. The most acute example of a battle between an Iranian proxy and a national government is Hezbollah in Lebanon. In this way, Iran is very different from North Korea, which does not pose an ideological challenge to anyone. Iran has had the goal of destroying Israel since the 1979 revolution. The significance of the threat today is that they are seeking the means to do so and to lead the Islamic world in this campaign. Paradoxically, the rise of Iran has caused many important regional leaders, most significantly Saudi Arabia, to consider Iran as their primary threat and to align themselves with Israel.

Prof. Menashri said that Iran is marking 28 years of its revolution with soul-searching. The revolution was not about establishing a clerical regime, but about getting rid of the corrupt Shah. The revolution was supposed to bring hope to their children, and it has not delivered. While the Islamic regime has achieved its goal of consolidating power, it has failed to prove the relevance of its ideology. Today, there are two schools in the Iranian leadership, pragmatists who are ready to compromise on ideology to gain political successes, and Ahmadinejad’s camp of strict dogmatists which is willing to pay a very high political price on ideological questions.

The clerics remain in power for four reasons. They speak in the name of God. They have the support of the Revolutionary Guard. They are determined and willing to use force. The opposition is divided. However, unlike in other Middle Eastern countries, reform movements are very active in Iran. Other factors supporting reform are the highest rate of internet usage in the Middle East (excluding Israel), the most active women’s movement, and an active, if not entirely free, media. The chance for success in the near term is low, but the necessary elements are there for reform in the long term.

Ahmadinejad, said Prof. Menashri, has served two important interests of the Iranian regime. His radical statements make the clerics appear moderate. Also, his far-reaching demands have given Iran sufficient bargaining room to negotiate back from them if they choose to, and still further their goals. The most worrying aspect of Ahmadinejad is his sense that he is paving the way for the return of the 12^th Imam with its apocalyptic implications. The United States, not Israel, should lead the response. Dialogue will probably not eliminate the threat, but it should be tried before action is taken. This dialogue should begin as soon as possible, because Iran is making progress and dialogue will shorten the time to action.